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ARTICLES
EXPANDED RIGHTS THROUGH STATE LAW: THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SHOWS STATE
COURTS THE WAY
Robert L. Brown*
I. INTRODUCTION
Three important cases decided during 2002 show the
Arkansas Supreme Court embracing the new judicial federalism
with a commitment and panache not previously seen in
Arkansas jurisprudence. In one four-month stretch, the court
used the search-and-seizure provision of the Arkansas
constitution as the basis for affirming the suppression of items
seized during an illegal night-time search,' affirmed the
constitutional invalidity of a pretextual arrest and the
* Associate Justice, Arkansas Supreme Court. I am indebted to my law clerk for the 2001-
2002 term, Erin Vinett, who not only did extensive research and analysis for this article but
also worked closely with me on the seminal cases that gave rise to it. Additional research,
which proved invaluable, was done by one of my 2002-2003 law clerks, Christian Harris,
while a second 2002-2003 law clerk, Michael Mosley, offered constructive comments. I
further am indebted to two interns who assisted in the research for this article: Frances
Caldwell of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock School's William H. Bowen of Law
and Jacob Gardner of the University of the South.
1. Griffin v. State, 67 S.W.3d 582 (Ark. 2002).
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suppression of the drugs obtained incident to it,2 and struck
down the state's criminal sodomy statute on grounds that it
violated both the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Arkansas constitution.'
Two primary factors led to this annus mirabilis in
Arkansas. The first, without question, was the United States
Supreme Court's express admonition in Arkansas v. Sullivan
4
that if the Arkansas Supreme Court was to expand individual
rights for its citizens, it must do so under its own state law and
not by means of a broader interpretation of the United States
Constitution. Reversing the alternative holding in Sullivan, the
Court said:
The Arkansas Supreme Court's alternative holding, that it
may interpret the United States Constitution to provide
greater protection than this Court's own federal
constitutional precedents provide, is foreclosed by Oregon
v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570, 95 S. Ct. 1215
(1975). There, we observed that the Oregon Supreme
Court's statement that it could "interpret the Fourth
Amendment more restrictively than interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court" was "not the law and surely
must be inadvertent error." Id. at 719, n. 4. We reiterated in
Hass that while "a State is free as a matter of its own law
to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those
this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional
standards," it "may not impose such greater restrictions as
a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court
specifically refrains from imposing them."'
Once the Court had spoken, the Arkansas defense bar took heed,
and where in the past the Arkansas constitution had been given
short shrift as the source of a remedy for governmental
infringement of individual rights, now it became a very real
resource for constitutional advocacy.
The second factor behind this notable shift to the new
judicial federalism was Arkansas's own common law, which in
a few distinct areas had already expanded individual rights
2. State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215 (Ark. 2002).
3. Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002).
4. 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam).
5. Id. at 772 (emphasis in original).
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beyond federal protections. For example, heightened
requirements for night-time searches and a skepticism toward
pretextual arrests have deep roots in Arkansas law.6 With the
Supreme Court's direction in Arkansas v. Sullivan and the
state's tradition of protecting individual rights in certain
narrowly defined areas behind it, the Arkansas Supreme Court
was primed and ready to expand individual rights on the basis of
its own state constitution.
After providing some background about the new judicial
federalism, the balance of this article will use an analysis of
Griffin, Sullivan, and Jegley to show how the Arkansas Supreme
Court, has, at the urging of the United States Supreme Court,
begun to apply that strain of jurisprudence to the cases before it.
II. THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
A. Origins
The new judicial federalism came into vogue in the 1970s,
with Justice William J. Brennan sounding the clarion call.7 A
6. Rule 13.2 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure outlines requirements for
obtaining night-time search warrants that are not mandated by federal law. The Arkansas
Supreme Court's longstanding antipathy toward pretextual arrests is best illustrated by its
decisions in Richardson v. State, 706 S.W.2d 363 (Ark. 1986), Hines v. State, 709 S.W.2d
65 (Ark. 1986), and Brewer v. State, 611 S.W.2d 179 (Ark. 1981).
7. G. Alan Tarr summarizes the emergence of the new judicial federalism in
Understanding State Constitutions (Princeton U. Press 1998):
Among the most heralded constitutional developments in recent years has been
state judges' increased reliance on state declarations of rights to secure rights
unavailable under the U.S. Constitution. This new judicial federalism, as it has
been labeled, emerged during the early 1970s, following the appointment of
Chief Justice Warren Burger to succeed Earl Warren on the U.S. Supreme Court,
and was encouraged by Justice William Brennan, a stalwart of the Warren Court.
Thus, when state courts began to rely on their state constitutions, critics charged
that they were merely attempting to evade Burger Court rulings and safeguard
the civil libertarian gains of the Warren Court. This criticism lost force,
however, as the new judicial federalism spread, and courts in every state
announced rulings based on the rights guarantees of their state constitutions.
Some state courts even indicated that they would henceforth address state
constitutional claims first and consider federal constitutional claims only when
cases could not be resolved on state grounds. By the mid-1990s, then, the new
judicial federalism had become an established feature of American federalism
and, most likely, a permanent one.
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primary focal point of this new federalism has been state courts'
reliance on state constitutions to provide rights no longer
available under the Supreme Court's increasinfly restrictive
interpretation of the United States Constitution. Many states
began in the 1980s and 1990s to afford additional protections to
their citizens, 9 and it is beyond dispute today that state supreme
courts have the authority to apply their own state law, even if it
diverges from federal precedent. In doing so, state supreme
courts have forthrightly asserted that the United States
Constitution provides the minimum national standard for
Writing in 1986, Justice William H. Brennan Jr. enthused that the "[r]ediscovery
by state supreme courts of the broader protections afforded their own citizens by
their state constitutions ... is probably the most important development in
constitutional jurisprudence in our time." Brennan's claim is supported by the
dramatic upsurge in state courts' reliance on state declarations of rights in civil-
liberties cases over the past twenty-five years. From 1950 to 1969, in only ten
cases did state judges rely on state guarantees to afford greater protection than
was available under the federal Constitution. However, from 1970 to 1986, they
did so in over three hundred cases.
Id. at 161-62, 165-66 (footnotes omitted). See also William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 501 (1977).
(noting the longstanding jurisdictional rule: "[S]tate decisions [grounded in state law] not
only cannot be overturned by, they indeed are not even reviewable by, the Supreme Court
of the United States. We are utterly without jurisdiction to review such decisions.")
(footnotes omitted).
8. See Brennan, supra n. 7, at 498.
9. See e.g. Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa 1999) (indicating that statute
precluding putative father from seeking to overcome presumption of paternity violated his
state due process rights, which are greater then those spelled out in federal Constitution);
Graves v. State, 708 S. 2d 858 (Miss. 1997) (holding that Mississippi constitution provides
greater protection from searches and seizures than that found in federal Constitution); State
v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347 (N.H. 1983) (stating that New Hampshire constitution bans
unreasonable search and seizure to a greater degree than does federal Constitution);
Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981) (holding that state constitutional guarantee
against "unnecessary rigor" in treatment of persons arrested or jailed overrides federal
constitutional claim); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that Vermont
constitution's common-benefits clause pre-dates and provides more protections than does
the federal Constitution's equal protection clause with regard to marriage licenses for
same-sex couples); State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927 (Wash. 1998) (holding that
Washington's constitution provides greater protections than the federal Constitution in
search-and-seizure context); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986) (noting that
protection of privacy interests in the state constitution prevent a person's long-distance
telephone records from being obtained from telephone company, even though seeking
those records is permissible under federal Constitution); see also Ronald K. L. Collins &
Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State
Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. Cin. L. Rev. 317, 318 n. 3 (1986)
(collecting cases from Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, Utah, and West Virginia).
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individual rights, and that the state courts are free to extend
additional protections under their own constitutions. The United
States Supreme Court has agreed.'°
B. Why Use The State Constitution?
Two important questions confront a state supreme court as
it considers diverging from federal precedent. The first is why a
state court should interpret its constitution differently from the
United States Constitution. The second is how such a divergence
should be accomplished."
One justification for a break with the federal analysis is
result-oriented: State courts should use their state constitutions
to avoid federal precedent that denies rights that the state courts
believe should be protected. Justice Brennan's seminal
recognition of the forces that underlie the new federalism is
perhaps the best-known statement of this approach." Not
surprisingly, Justice Brennan's view has become associated with
a liberal judicial agenda, both in praise and in criticism."
10. See Mich. v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) ("It is fundamental that state courts
be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions." (quoting Minn. v.
Natl. Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940))).
11. Former California Supreme Court Justice Joseph R. Grodin puts the two questions
this way:
One issue is the specific, and for some courts, threshold issue as to what role
federal Supreme Court constitutional decisions should play in the state court's,
analysis. Thus, the issue becomes whether the Supreme Court's decision is
entitled to some sort of "deference" even though the Court is construing a
different document pertaining to a different polity, or whether the state court
should feel free to pursue an independent course. The second related issue is
how the state court should analyze the state constitutional issue, that is, whether
it should analyze a case in terms of the doctrine that the United States Supreme
Court has developed for analysis of the cognate federal constitutional issue, or
whether it should develop its own, possibly improved, doctrine.
Joseph Grodin, State Constitutionalism in Practice, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. 601, 607 (1996)
(reviewing Intellect and Craft: The Contributions of Justice Hans Linde to American
Constitutionalism (Robert F. Nagel ed., Westville Press 1995)).
12. See generally Brennan, supra n. 7.
13. See e.g. Marie L. Garibaldi, The Rhenquist Court and State Constitutional Law, 34
Tulsa L.J. 67, 68 (1998) (noting that state courts "began to turn to their state constitutions
as a means to provide their citizens with greater rights than they were receiving under the
Federal Constitution"); Paul W. Khan, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of
Fairness, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. 459, 464 (1996) (characterizing the early phases of the state
constitutional movement as "a kind of forum shopping for liberals"); Earl M. Maltz, False
Prophet-Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15 Hastings Const.
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A second justification for state constitutionalism has been
called process-based, because it is rooted in the idea that state
courts are duty bound to look to state constitutions as part of the
dual-sovereignty relationship between the federal government
and the several states. Many state constitutions were in existence
before the creation of the United States Constitution, which
suggests to those like former Oregon Supreme Court Justice
Hans Linde, an influential figure in the new judicial federalism, 4
that state courts have a duty to undertake this separate analysis:' 5
[A] state court should approach its state constitution as a
truly independent document.., it should not only refrain
from following "lockstep" in the path of trod by the United
States Supreme Court, but.., it need not and should not
insist upon a showing of some special "justification" for
departing from that path.... State constitutional law is not
common law to be molded into a homogeneous body of• 6
principles.
When the United States Supreme Court reminded the
Arkansas Supreme Court in 2001 of its independent authority to
construe its own constitution, the Arkansas court responded with
Griffin, Sullivan, and Picado. Together, these cases illustrate the
ways in which its departure from federal precedent can be seen
as a matter of duty under a process-based theory.
L.Q. 429 (1988) (charging that judges who deviate from federal precedent do so for
unprincipled, liberal reasons rather than principled, jurisprudential ones).
14. See Grodin, supra n. 1I, at 605-606 (discussing Justice Linde's analysis of state
constitutions).
15. Id. at 606 ("Linde makes clear that state courts should consider their own
constitutions first.").
16. Id. at 607. Former Justice Tobriner of the California Supreme Court gives a similar
justification:
Just as the United States Supreme Court bears the ultimate judicial responsibility
for determining matters of federal law, this court bears the responsibility for
resolving questions of state law, including the proper interpretation of provisions
of the state constitution. In fulfilling this difficult and grave responsibility, we
cannot properly relegate our task to the judicial guardians of the federal
Constitution, but instead must recognize our personal obligation to exercise
independent legal judgment in ascertaining the meaning and application of state
constitutional provisions.
People v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 401, 412 (Cal. 1980) (citations omitted). See also Rachel A.
Van Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28 N.M. L. Rev. 199,
202 (1998) (suggesting that state judges who defer unnecessarily to federal precedent
"shirk theirjudicial duties").
EXPANDED RIGHTS THROUGH STATE LAW
C. How To Use The State Constitution
Various state supreme courts have taken different
approaches in their usage of their state constitutions. The initial
question is at what point should state supreme courts examine
their own constitutions in their decision-making-before claims
are analyzed under the United States Constitution or afterward?
The primary advocate for examining state constitutions first is
Justice Linde, who concluded that state supreme courts have a
judicial duty to do so."
The second approach in state constitutional analysis comes
from the opposite direction: Claims are analyzed under the
United States Constitution first, and only if the claimed right
fails there is the state constitution considered. 8 This method,
followed by the New Mexico Supreme Court, 9 seeks a balance
between following federal precedent slavishly and diverging too
much from it, and, according to that court, may be the best way
to assure that the state does not deviate too radically from
federal precedent and create law that lacks cohesiveness with the
national constitution. ° Justice David Souter, while sitting on the
New Hampshire Supreme Court, characterized the balance
sought by this second method with characteristic aplomb:
It is the need of every appellate court for the participation
of the bar in the process of trying to think sensibly and
comprehensively about the questions that the judicial
power has been established to answer. Nowhere is the need
greater than in the field of State constitutional law, where
we are asked so often to confront questions that have
already been decided under the National Constitution. If we
place too much reliance on federal precedent we will render
the State rules a mere row of shadows; if we place too little,• 21
we will render State practice incoherent.
Irrespective of when the state constitution is examined, the
next critical question is to determine in what circumstances
17. Grodin, supra n. 11, at 606.
18. See Van Cleave, supra n. 16, at 209-210.
19. See e.g. State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 7-8 (N.M. 1997).
20. Id. at 7.
21. State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H. 1986) (Souter, J., concurring
specially).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
federal precedent should be discarded in favor of state law.
Many states have identified specific criteria,22 commonly
articulating a desire for the state court to maintain its
legitimacy.23 The Washington Supreme Court's announced
criteria-all drawn from existing case law and commentary-
are illustrative: (1) the textual language of the state constitution;
(2) differences in the texts of parallel provisions in the state and
federal constitutions; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting
state law; (5) structural differences between the state and federal
constitutions; and (6) matters of particular state or local
concern. The court explained that these criteria were designed
to ensure that when the court deviates from federal precedent, its
decision "will be made for well founded legal reasons and not
by merely substituting our notion of justice for that of duly
elected legislative bodies or the United States Supreme Court."
Applying them in the case before it, the Gunwall court
concluded that police officers violated a defendant's right to
privacy under the Washington constitution when they obtained
her long-distance telephone records and placed a pen register on
26her telephone line without a warrant.
New Jersey, another state with a well-developed state
constitutional jurisprudence, also uses the criteria approach.
Justice Handler first outlined that state's seven criteria when
concurring in State v. Hunt,27 listing them as (1) the textual
language of the state constitution, (2) legislative history of the
state constitution, (3) preexisting state law, (4) structural
differences between the state and federal constitutions, (5)
matters of particular state interest or local concern, (6) state
22. See Van Cleave, supra n. 16, at 219-20; see also Garibaldi, supra n. 13, at 75-76
(discussing New Jersey's criteria-based approach).
23. See Van Cleave, supra n. 16, at 219-22. Cf Garibaldi, supra n. 13, at 80-83
(surveying arguments against the new judicial federalism, and concluding that the New
Jersey approach to state constitutionalism best balances the role of the states and the
federal government because it is sensitive to the leadership role of the United States
Supreme Court).
24. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (Wash. 1986).
25. Id. at 813.
26. Id. at 816
27. 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
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traditions, and (7) the distinctive public attitudes of the state's
citizens.28
New Mexico, too, uses the criteria approach. In Gomez, the
New Mexico Supreme Court announced that it would look to the
federal constitution first, and if the federal constitution left the
right in question unprotected, the court would use the following
three factors to determine if a departure from federal precedent
was justified: (1) a flawed federal analysis, (2) structural
differences between state and federal government, and (3)
distinctive state characteristics. 29 Unlike Washington's and New
Jersey's, the New Mexico factors de-emphasize the importance
of historical and textual differences between the state and
federal constitutions.
Although no approach has yet emerged as dominant,
Professor Van Cleave regards the New Mexico factors as
preferable to the Washington court's Gunwall factors, especially
as the third New Mexico factor requires the state court to
critically evaluate federal decisions in light of local conditions
and rely exclusively on "principled analysis." 3
III. ARKANSAS COMMON LAW
Although Arkansas was late in wholeheartedly embracing
its state constitution as a vehicle for expanded individual rights,
there were signs during the 1970s and 1980s that its common
law was in sync with the new judicial federalism. Arkansas's
pre-Sullivan broadening of individual rights is typified by two
strains of cases, those involving law-enforcement officers'
motives for making arrests, and those detailing the requirements
for a permissible night-time search.
The Arkansas court's continued examination of law
enforcement's motives in making an arrest is particularly worthy
of note since the United States Supreme Court long ago
abandoned the subjective motives of police officers as a relevant
28. Id. at 965-67 (Handler, J., concurring). The entire court later adopted Justice
Handler's criteria in State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1983).
29. Gomez, 932 P.2d at 7.
30. See Van Cleave, supra n. 16, at 221-23.
31. Id. at 223.
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subject of inquiry.32 Since 1973, the Court has focused solely on
whether a legitimate basis for the arrest existed, no matter how
dubious that basis might have been, or whether it was, in reality,
a mere pretext for searching the suspect or his vehicle. The
Arkansas Supreme Court disagrees with this approach, and has
continued under its state constitution to examine the subjective
intent and motivation of police officers when considering the
suppression issue.33
The Arkansas Supreme Court's perennial sensitivity to the
showing to be required of law-enforcement officers before the
grant of a night-time search warrant is a second example. Since
1976, Rule 13.2(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure
has required law-enforcement officers to jump through specific
hoops not required of their federal counterparts before obtaining
a night-time search warrant. 34 Added to this has been the
Arkansas Supreme Court's strict interpretation of Rule 13.2(c)
and its holdings that a mere reiteration of the Rule's factors is
not sufficient. Instead, facts supporting the necessary factors
32. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafsen v. Florida, 414 U.S.
260 (1973). See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (reiterating Robinson-
Gustafsen doctrine); Ark. v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam).
33. State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215, 221 (Ark. 2002) ("Under these authorities [state
constitution and common law], pretextual arrests-arrests that would not have occurred but
for an ulterior investigative motive-are unreasonable police conduct warranting
application of the exclusionary rule.") (emphasis in original). See also n. 6, supra.
34. The rule's requirements are explicit:
(c) Except as hereafter provided, the search warrant shall provide that it be
executed between the hours of six a.m. and eight p.m., and within a reasonable
time not to exceed sixty (60) days. Upon a finding by the issuing judicial officer
of reasonable cause to believe that:
(i) the place to be searched is difficult of speedy access; or
(ii) the objects to be seized are in danger of imminent removal; or
(iii) the warrant can only be safely or successfully executed at nighttime or
under circumstances the occurrence of which is difficult to predict with
accuracy;
the issuing judicial officer may, by appropriate provision in the warrant,
authorize its execution at any time, day or night, and within a reasonable time,
not to exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance.
35. E.g. Fouse v. State, 989 S.W.2d 146 (Ark. 1999); Garner v. State, 820 S.W.2d 446,
449-50 (Ark. 1991) (noting that "[t]he privacy of citizens in their homes, secure from
nighttime intrusions, is a right of vast importance as attested not only by our Rules, but also
by our state and federal constitutions").
EXPANDED RIGHTS THROUGH STATE LAW
must be provided to the magistrate. 6 Without such a factual
basis, the court has repeatedly held that the results of the search
must be suppressed.
Against this backdrop, Griffin, Sullivan, and Picado can be
examined as illustrative of the Arkansas court's approach to
divergence from federal precedent.
IV. GRIFFIN V. STATE: CURTILAGE
It was in a night-time search case37 that the Arkansas
Supreme Court first relied on its state constitution" to invalidate
an unreasonable search. In Griffin, law-enforcement officers had
heard from anonymous sources that Griffin was selling
methamphetamine. The officers later acknowledged that they
did not have probable cause to obtain a search warrant to search
the residence he shared with his parents, but decided to approach
it nonetheless and use the knock-and-talk investigative
procedure.39 Four of them approached the residence well after
sunset one evening, carrying flashlights that they used while
visually inspecting parked vehicles and an outbuilding before
knocking on the door of the residence and engaging Griffin in
conversation about his suspected drug activity. During that
conversation, the police secured Griffin's consent to a search of
36. See e.g. Fouse, 989 S.W.2d at 148 (discussing Langford v. State, 962 S.W.2d 358
(Ark. 1998) and Coleman v. State, 826 S.W.2d 273 (Ark. 1992)); State v. Martinez, 811
S.W.2d 319 (Ark. 1991); Hall v. State, 789 S.W.2d 456 (Ark. 1990); State v. Broadway,
599 S.W.2d 721 (Ark. 1980).
37. Griffin v. State, 67 S.W.3d 582 (Ark. 2002).
38. Article 2, § 15 of the Arkansas constitution provides:
The right of the people of this state to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the people
or thing to be seized.
Ark. Const. art. 2, § 15.
39. The knock-and-talk procedure has been described as follows:
In recent years, the phenomenon of the "knock and talk" procedure has come
into vogue as a substitute for obtaining either a nighttime or a daytime search
warrant. Police officers simply accost a person at his or her home, because they
do not have sufficient proof to establish probable cause for a search warrant. The
police officers obtain a verbal consent to search the home from the homeowner
and proceed with the search.
Griffin, 67 S.W.3d at 591 (Brown, J., concurring).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
his home, in the course of which they found methamphetamine
and drug paraphernalia.
Griffin was arrested and charged with possession of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver, simultaneous
possession of drugs and a firearm, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. He moved to suppress the evidence based on an
unlawful search, and the trial court denied his motion. He then
entered a plea of guilty conditioned on his appeal. The Arkansas
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and held that
the police officers' visual inspection of Griffin's curtilage prior
to approaching the door of his residence and obtaining his
consent was a violation of his expectation of privacy.
The Griffin decision was in part a direct response to the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Sullivan:
We have in many cases harmonized the protections
afforded by Article 2, Section 15, of our state constitution
with those provided by the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. See Mullinax v. State, 327 Ark.
41, 938 S.W.2d 801 (1997); Stout v. State, 320 Ark. 552,
898 S.W.2d 457 (1995). However, we base our analysis of
this case upon our own state law as expressed by our state
constitution, statutes, and cases, recognizing that while we
lack authority to extend the protections of the Fourth
Amendment beyond the holdings of the United States
Supreme Court, we do have the authority to impose greater
restrictions on police activities in our state based upon our
own state law than those the Supreme Court holds to be
necessary based upon federal constitutional standards. See
Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 121 S. Ct. 1876, 149
L.Ed.2d 994 (2001).40
No specific federal case was rejected by the Griffin court in
reaching its decision, which sets it apart from the other cases
analyzed here.4' In fact, the Griffin court acknowledged that
federal law might also support invalidating a search like the one
40. 67 S.W.3d at 584.
41. As will be discussed below, see §§ V & VI, infra, the Arkansas Supreme Court
rejected Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), in State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215
(Ark. 2002), and Bowers v. Hardwick, 487 U.S. 186 (1986), in Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d
332 (Ark. 2002). In addition, it noted in Box v. State, 71 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Ark. 2002), that
"greater protection is afforded under our state constitution than that set out in Estelle [v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976)1."
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that occurred at Griffin's residence.42 Nonetheless, it chose to
base its decision solely on the Arkansas constitution.
Griffin is also noteworthy for its constitutional reasoning.
The Griffin court engaged in a historical analysis of the
Arkansas constitution, pointing out that
[i]n many states, the principle that a person should be
protected against unreasonable searches and seizures of
their persons, houses, papers, and effects was well-
established before the 1786 Constitutional Convention
adopted a similar restriction, the Fourth Amendment,
forbidding the central government from issuing warrants
without probable cause .... The 1780 Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights was the first to use the phrase
"unreasonable searches and seizures." ... The public furor
over the issuance by the King of writs of assistance
granting customs officials unlimited power of search and
seizure had fueled the spirit of independence of the
colonies... The principle that a man's home is his castle,
and that even the King is prohibited from unreasonably
intruding upon that home, was particularly well- developed
in the rough-and-ready culture of the frontier, and no less
pronounced in the Arkansas Territory. In our 1836
Constitution, the people of our newly admitted state
expressed this principle succinctly in the following
language:
9. That the people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and that general warrants,
whereby any officer may be commanded to search
suspected places without evidence of the fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not
named whose offenses are not particularly described
and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty,
and shall not be granted.
Id. (emphasis added).
This principle is now articulated in Article 2, Section 15, of
the present Arkansas constitution, which provides that "the
right of the people of this State to be secure in their
42. Griffin, 67 S.W.3d at 584.
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persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated."43
The other point of significance in Griffin is the stance taken
by three of the concurring justices, which may prove, in time, to
have augured well for the court's future rejection of the knock-
and-talk procedure as an investigative method when a written
consent from the homeowner is absent. 44 All three concurrences
had their foundation in the Arkansas constitution, and all three
concurring justices rejected the federal case law on consent
searches. Indeed, they took issue particularly with the idea that
law-enforcement officers need not, under Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte,45 inform homeowners of their right to refuse to
consent to a search. A sampling of the three concurrences
follows:
Even more troubling is that the lead officer in this case,
Officer Johnson, admitted that he made a conscious
decision not to inform Appellant of his right to refuse
consent. He explained that he was better off not offering
any information because, on some occasions in the past, he
has informed suspects of their right to refuse and they
denied consent to search. In other words, Officer Johnson
intentionally refrained from informing Appellant of his
right to refuse because he was afraid that Appellant might
actually invoke his right. On this issue, I agree with Justice
Brown that we should interpret the Arkansas Constitution
as requiring that the right to refuse consent be explained
before "knock and talk" searches will be upheld.46
No state, either by statute or court decision, currently
requires that a homeowner sign a written consent form
advising that homeowner of a right to refuse the search
before the search can begin. Yet, such consent forms are
being used by individual law enforcement agencies in
Arkansas as came to light in a recent "knock and talk" case
43. 67 S.W.3d at 584-85 (internal citations omitted).
44. While the Arkansas Supreme Court has heard cases involving the knock-and-talk
procedure, no Arkansas case has squarely raised the state constitutional argument. See e.g.
Scott v. State, 67 S.W.3d 567 (Ark. 2002) (declining to address state constitutional
argument in a knock-and-talk case when the accused failed to raise it).
45. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
46. 67 S.W.3d at 590-91 (Corbin, J., concurring).
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submitted to this Court for decision. See Scott v. State, [67
S.W.3d 567 (2002)]. I think using consent forms has merit.
Requiring a homeowner to execute a consent form before
the search begins would be tangible proof that a consent
was given. The language of the form, in addition, would
ensure that the individual is presented with the fact that
consent can be refused. It would not eliminate all
controversy surrounding a "knock and talk" consent, but it
would remove some of the credibility battles between
police officers and homeowners as well as other evidentiary
quagmires that currently afflict our courts in this context,
much as the Miranda waiver form has done for police
interrogations.47
He also testified that using the method noted above, he got
consent up to eighty percent of the time. Officer Johnson
further testified that he had consent forms, but that he did
not use them, and believed he was under no compulsion to
advise a person they need not consent to the search. That
statement in and of itself reveals acknowledgment that
some persons may well have believed they had no choice
but to submit to the search. The "knock and talk" raises
significant issues, and unfortunately reinforces the concern
that law enforcement should not be acting on their own.
The better approach would be to do the necessary police
work to entitle the police to a search warrant. The
preference in the law is for a warrant, and it is so strong
that less persuasive evidence than would support a
warrantless search will justify the issuance of a search
warrant.48
It also bears noting that the Griffin court used a Gunwall
factor-constitutional history-in interpreting the Arkansas
constitution.49 The court referred to the text of the now-
superseded 1836 version of the state constitution, which
contained language condemning unreasonable searches and
general warrants as "dangerous to liberty."5 ° The court
47. Id. at 592 (Brown, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
48. Id. at 595 (Hannah, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
49. See id. at 585.
50. Id.
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concluded that this strong language, and the public policy that it
represented in the "rough and ready culture of the [Arkansas]
frontier," is "now articulated in Article 2, Section 15, of the
present Arkansas constitution. '"5 But of equal significance in
Griffin are the three concurring opinions raising questions about
whether the knock-and-talk procedure passes muster under the
Arkansas constitution.
V. STATE V. SULLIVAN: PRETEXTUAL ARREST
A few weeks after deciding Griffin, the Arkansas Supreme
Court handed down a second decision grounded on the Arkansas
constitution, State v. Sullivan.12 This time, in a case on remand
from the Supreme Court, the Arkansas court expressly expanded
individual rights beyond what federal law would permit.
Sullivan, a disabled roofer, was pulled over for driving just
above the speed limit by a police officer who knew that he had
previously been involved in narcotics activity. The officer then
noticed a roofing hatchet rusted fast to the carpet of Sullivan's
vehicle and arrested him for possession of a weapon, illegal
window-tinting, driving an unsafe vehicle, and failing to
produce proof of registration and insurance. A subsequent
inventory search revealed drugs in Sullivan's vehicle. The trial
court suppressed the drugs as incident to a pretextual arrest on
the basis that the arrest was only made so that the police officer
could search for drugs. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.
The state was unhappy with that result, and so the case
meandered through rehearing, a writ of certiorari from the
United States Supreme Court, reversal and remand, and finally,
a second opinion by the Arkansas Supreme Court in which the
evidence was again suppressed. 3
51. Id.
52. 74 S.W.3d 215 (Ark. 2002).
53. The procedural history of this case is somewhat complicated. In the first Sullivan
case, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's suppression of the evidence on
the basis that the arresting officer's actions were pretextual. State v. Sullivan, 11 S.W.3d
526 (Ark. 2000). After the court's decision in the first appeal, the State petitioned for
rehearing, arguing that the court did not follow Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996). In the original briefing of the issues, neither party had cited Whren to the Arkansas
Supreme Court, which eventually denied the petition for rehearing but issued a
supplemental opinion addressing the Whren case. State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551 (Ark.
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Unlike the Griffin decision, which focused on constitutional
history, the decision after remand in Sullivan concentrated on
the jurisprudence of pretextual arrests in Arkansas. The Sullivan
court traced that common-law history back more than twenty
years, noting points at which it diverged from prevailing federal
precedent, and consequently rejected the Court's decision in
Whren,54 which effectively foreclosed pretextual police conduct
as a basis for suppression of evidence under the Fourth
Amendment. The Arkansas Supreme Court instead relied on the
Arkansas constitution and this state's common law to invalidate
the pretextual arrest and resulting search in Sullivan.
The Sullivan decision after remand also signals the
Arkansas Supreme Court's possible retreat from Atwater v. Lago
Vista,55 in which the Supreme Court held that a full custodial
arrest was a permissible response to any violation of the penal
law, including a fine-only traffic offense. The Arkansas
Supreme Court said that Atwater "raises potential concerns" 56
under state law, but declined to break with its holding because
Sullivan did not squarely raise the issue. It is bound to arise
sooner or later, however, and the Arkansas court seems likely to
recall when it does that the Supreme Court has authorized it to
focus when appropriate on the requirements of its own state law.
VI. JEGLEY V. PICADO: DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
While Griffin was based on the history of Arkansas's
constitution and Sullivan on Arkansas's common law, Jegley v.
Picado57 combines these two approaches.58 The decision,
2000). In this decision on rehearing, the court rejected the rationale of Whren, stating that it
was free to grant Sullivan more protection under the United States Constitution than the
federal courts have seen fit to provide. Id. at 552 (supplemental opinion on denial of
rehearing). After losing on rehearing, the State petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court granted the petition, and in Ark. v. Sullivan, 532
U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam), reversed the decision on rehearing. On remand from the
United States Supreme Court, the Arkansas Supreme Court again affirmed the trial court,
but this time based its decision on the Arkansas constitution. State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d
215 (Ark. 2002).
54. State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215 (Ark. 2002).
55. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
56. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d at 222.
57. 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002).
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however, rests in addition on an analysis of the differences
between the texts of the state and federal constitutions.
The Picado complaint was brought by a group of gay and
lesbian Arkansans who sought a declaration that the state's
sodomy statute was a violation of their due process and equal
protection rights under the Arkansas constitution.59 The trial
court agreed, and entered an order declaring the statute to be
unconstitutional. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the sodomy statute was unconstitutional on both
due process and equal protection grounds, thus rejecting Bowers
v. Hardwick,6 ° in which the Supreme Court held that the right to
privacy did not protect private, consensual, noncommercial
sexual behavior.
The due process portion of the Picado opinion considered
several provisions of the Arkansas constitution as well as case
and statutory law. In each of these categories, the court found a
strong foundation for privacy protection, and concluded that any
58. The Jegley court relied on the common-law history of Arkansas as reflected in its
rules of criminal procedure and its criminal-procedure jurisprudence. Id. at 348-49. The
court also relied on statutory law, noting that "privacy is mentioned in more than eighty
statutes enacted by the Arkansas General Assembly," id. at 347, and that Arkansas's cases
addressing privacy torts indicate that the state has a strong common-law tradition of
protecting privacy. Id. at 349-350.
59. The sodomy statute, former Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-122 (Repl. 1997), read:
(a) A person commits sodomy if such person performs any act of sexual
gratification involving:
(1) the penetration, however slight, of the anus or mouth of an animal or a
person by the penis of a person of the same sex or an animal; or
(2) the penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus of an animal or a
person by any body member of a person of the same sex or an animal.
(b) sodomy is a Class A misdemeanor.
60. 487 U.S. 186 (1986). After Bowers, several other state supreme courts had already
based their decisions invalidating state sodomy statutes on their state constitutions. See
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (holding that Kentucky's
constitution provides more protection than U.S. Constitution with regard to equal
protection and the right to privacy); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (focusing
on an individual's right to privacy under the Montana constitution and noting that equal
protection guarantees made the case justiciable); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47
(Pa. 1980) (holding that Pennsylvania's sodomy statute violates equal protection by
exceeding the valid bounds of police power); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250
(Tenn. 1996) (declaring that the privacy of homosexuals is a fundamental privacy right
under the Tennessee Constitution's guarantee of due process). New York's Court of
Appeals invalidated that state's sodomy statute even before Bowers was decided. People v.
Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (invalidating sodomy law by holding that equal
protection could be applied to sodomy statutes regardless of a citizen's right to privacy).
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infringement upon Arkansans' fundamental right to privacy in
their own homes must be justified by a compelling state interest.
The court further held that the sodomy statute was not based on
an interest sufficiently compelling to justify governmental
intrusion into the bedrooms of same-sex couples.
The equal protection portion of the opinion rejected the
trial court's reasoning that the sodomy statute represented
gender-based discrimination calling for intermediate scrutiny,
and used instead a rational-basis review.61 Despite that less
rigorous scrutiny, the Picado court found that the sodomy statute
violated Arkansas's equal protection guarantee. Holding that the
sodomy statute was not supported by any rational basis because
the state advanced no justification for it other than a general and
vague notion that public morality needed to be protected, the
court pointed out that "[t]here is no contention that same-sex
sodomy implicates the public health or welfare, the efficient
administration of government, the economy, the citizenry, or the
promotion of the family unit." 6 2
The Picado court looked not only to the history of privacy
in Arkansas's constitution but also to its privacy jurisprudence
in a variety of contexts, including criminal and tort cases. The
court then gave two new reasons for diverging from federal
precedent: (1) the proliferation of statutory law in Arkansas that
protects privacy, and (2) "the textual and structural differences
between the Bill of Rights and our own Declaration of Rights."63
Thus, the court's reasoning in Picado added another of the
Gunwall factors--differences in the text-to its list of criteria
for when it will diverge from federal interpretations.
While the Picado decision itself is rather narrow, it has a
potentially broader application than do the search-and-seizure
cases in that its ramifications may extend to other substantive
due process areas involving privacy issues. Accordingly, the
ripple effect of Picado may prove to be wide indeed.
61. Picado, 80 S.W.3d at 351.
62. Id. at 353.
63. Id. at 345.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Slow though it may have been to embrace the new judicial
federalism, the Arkansas Supreme Court has recently made up
for lost time. In both Griffin and Sullivan, the Arkansas Supreme
Court noted that it had authority to diverge from federal
precedent where appropriate, but neither opinion stated that the
court believed that it had a duty to do so." In Picado, however,
the court stated that when there are "textual and structural"
differences between the United States Constitution and the
Arkansas constitution, it must perform a state constitutional
analysis.65 Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court can be counted
among those that choose a process-based analysis to justify the
use of the state constitution instead of among those courts that
are interested only in results.
Accurately predicting the development of the law is always
a challenge, but future decisions will no doubt clarify whether
Arkansas courts should examine the state constitution first when
claims are made under both constitutions. They seem likely also
to provide the Arkansas Supreme Court with an opportunity to
consider and apply the remaining Gunwall factors. It appears as
well that the validity of knock-and-talk investigative procedures
will soon be contested under the Arkansas constitution, and that
the United States Supreme Court's approval of full arrests for
fine-only traffic offenses will, at some point, be questioned in
Arkansas on state constitutional grounds.
Now that the levee has been breached, the criminal-defense
bar unquestionably will raise a host of suppression arguments
and privacy issues under the state constitution, and it is
impossible to foresee where those challenges might lead. All of
this is to say that with the endorsement of the United States
Supreme Court, the Arkansas constitution is now and will
continue to be a fertile resource for expanding individual rights
64. See Griffin, 67 S.W.3d at 584; Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d at 218 (both citing Ark. v.
Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (per curiam)).
65. Picado, 80 S.W.3d at 345 ("the textual and structural differences between the Bill
of Rights and our own Declaration of Rights mandate that we explore whether [a right to
private, consensual, noncommercial sexual activity in the home] exists under the Arkansas
Constitution") (emphasis added).
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under the guardianship of a newly energized state supreme
court.

